One Minute to Midnight: Amending the War Powers Resolution to Confront the Coming Cyber Wars by Monarch, Benjamin L.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 103 | Issue 3 Article 9
2015
One Minute to Midnight: Amending the War
Powers Resolution to Confront the Coming Cyber
Wars
Benjamin L. Monarch
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Monarch, Benjamin L. (2015) "One Minute to Midnight: Amending the War Powers Resolution to Confront the Coming Cyber
Wars," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 103 : Iss. 3 , Article 9.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol103/iss3/9
One Minute to Midnight: Amending the War Powers
Resolution to Confront the Coming Cyber Wars
Benjamin L. Monarch'
INTRODUCTION
In the not-too-distant future, Americans may find their technology-laden lives
disrupted by an anonymous and seemingly omnipotent force. On that day, many of
our basic assumptions about our way of life will be toppled, and it is possible that
our lives may be irreparably altered.
Imagine that an undergraduate needs to pay tuition for his upcoming semester,
enters his ATM pin to check that he has the necessary funds, and finds that his
account balance is erroneously zero.2 More alarming, consider a mother who
administers a routine antibiotic to her child for an illness, and suddenly the child
collapses into anaphylactic shock because the child's medical records noting the
allergy had been manipulated.' In another scenario, a businesswoman is flying at
36,000 feet when her airliner enters an inexplicable nosedive and the pilots are
denied all manual control of the plane. 4 Envision a grandmother battling
hypothermia in her Milwaukee home because the regional power plant has
mysteriously exploded in February' or that a freight train carrying toxic chemicals
has jumped the rails in a rural Alabama community requiring an immediate
evacuation of the surrounding area.6 Even more catastrophic, visualize a deadly
E-coli outbreak afflicting millions in Southern California because the sewer lines
have flowed into the water supply.7
'University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. Candidate May 2015.
2 See Colleen Long, Global Network of Hackers Steals $45M from ATMs, AP: THE BIG STORY
(May 10, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/global-network-hackers-steal-45m-atms.
' See KOMO Staff, Security Breach Exposes 6,000 Gng County Medical Records, KOMO NEWS
(Jan. 13, 2014, 8:03 PM), http://www.komonews.com/news/1ocal/Security-breach-exposes-6000-King-
Co-medical-records-240033631.html.
4 See Sam Grobart, Hacking an Airplane With Only an Android Phone, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/artides/2013-04-12/hacking-an-
airplane-with-only-an-android-phone.
s See Matthew L. Wald, Attack Ravages Power Grid. (just a Test.), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013,
http://nytimes.com/2013/11/15/us/coast-to-coast-simulating-onslaught-against-power-grid.html?_r=0.
'See Aliya Sternstein, Hackers Manipulated Railway Computers, TSA Memo Says, NEXTGOV
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2012/01/hackers-manipulated-railway-
computers-tsa-memo-says/50498/print/.
' See Ellen Messmer, DHS: America's Water and Power Utilities under Daily Cyber-Attack,
NETWORK WORLD (Apr. 4, 2012, 10:52 AM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2012/040412-
dhs-cyberattack-257946.html.
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Each of these calamities, among numerous others, can be inflicted through
cyberspace. Forty years ago this would not have been possible. However, in the last
four decades, our civilization has designed a physical world that functions per the
mechanisms of cyberspace. This development has bestowed unimaginable benefits,
but it has also created or amplified terrifying risks. The largest of these risks is that
cyberspace will become a new battlefield in future wars, and each of the dreadful
happenings mentioned above could be a tactic employed in such a war. To mitigate
this dark future, rules and procedures must be developed to steer the world through
these dangers.
This Note will first address the origin of cyber war and develop a dear
description of what cyber war entails. It will then explore the current status of cyber
war policy and, ultimately, propose a legislative response to the issues raised by this
uncharted battlefield. Specifically, this Note calls for the War Powers Resolution of
1973 ("WPR") to be amended to simultaneously expand presidential authority and
enhance congressional oversight over cyber war-making. The idiosyncrasies of
cyber conflict necessitate greater flexibility than the Commander-in-Chief is
currently allowed under the WPR, but Congress should not issue the President a
blank check to launch cyber attacks unilaterally.
I. APPROACHING THE RUBICON: A HISTORY OF
CYBERSPACE AND CYBER DESTRUCTION
Understanding how and why cyberspace has created previously inconceivable
threats requires looking back to the basic infrastructure of the Internet in its
infancy. The forbearers of cyberspace did not, and likely could not, forecast what
effect the Internet would have on society, or, moreover, how it would become a
medium for criminality and bellicosity. As a consequence, they unwittingly
designed a system ripe for such problems.
Establishing when the Internet began is not an easy task because its premise of
electronic information transmission is not a modern concept. Abraham Lincoln
was the first President to use the telegraph to direct war commands.' Then, eighty
years later electronic communication was an essential tool of the Allied powers
during World War II. These early electronic communications relied upon a system
known as circuit switching, which consists of a simple Point A to Point B
electronic connection over a dedicated transmission line (e.g., a traditional
telephone call)."o The circuit-switching system, while revolutionary, was too rigid
to take full advantage of the data-oriented microprocessor age of the late 1960's-
namely, development of a communications network comprised of multiple users
sending information sporadically to different destinations."
I Rex Hughes, A Treaty for Cyberspace, 86 INT'L AFF. 523, 526 (2010).
9 Id.
"o Lee Copeland, Packet-Switched vs. Circuit-Switched Networks, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 20,
2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/41904.
" See id.; see also Lawrence G. Roberts, The Evolution of Packet Switching, 66 PROC. IEEE
1307, 1307, 1311 (1978).
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The technology race of the Cold War warranted such a network.2 In 1969,
United States military analysts and various computer scientists, operating under the
eventual name Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ("DARPA"),
successfully launched an alternative to the traditional circuit-switching system.' 3
The new system relied upon a less strict medium of communication known as
"packet switching."" Packet switching differed from circuit switching because it
grouped data into "packets" rather than one continuous electronic transmission,
which allowed data to be parsed and allocated across multiple, perpetually open
lines of transmission. s In short, the packets made it feasible to create a
multi-transmission network of lines in contrast to the single-line transmission
circuit-switching system. The developers named the new system Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network ("ARPANET"). 6 Though ARPANET was
built for Defense Department communication, it initially connected computers at
UCLA, Stanford, UC Santa Barbara, and the University of Utah." ARPANET
evolved to become what nearly every person on Earth knows as the Internet.
In order to meet the expectations of a packet-switching network, ARPANET
had two features that are today the central pillars of the Internet.
First, ARPANET was an open, mostly decentralized domain." In other words,
it allowed various users to access it easily, provided numerous points of entry
known as "gateways," and lacked central control of the network. " This
infrastructure envisioned a network used by thousands of scientists exchanging
benign, mundane research, not billions of users exchanging anything from flight
paths to birthday party pictures to stock purchase orders. Former Special Advisor to
the President for Cyber Security Richard Clarke said of ARPANET, "[w]hile the
protocols that were developed based on these [factors] allowed for the massive
growth in networking and the creation of the Internet as we know it today, they
also sowed the seeds for the security problems."" Simply put, the Internet's design
makes it very easy to use toward destructive ends. However, this same design is
what also allows the Internet to enable marvelous achievements. This dichotomy
underlies the difficulty of policymaking vis-A-vis the Internet.
12 See Hughes, supra note 8.
13 See Mitch Waldrop, DARPA and the Internet Revolution, in DARPA: 50 YEARS OF
BRIDGING THE GAP 78, 83 (2008), available at http://www.darpa.mil/about/history/first_50_years
.aspx.
" See Copeland, supra note 10.
1s Id.
16 Hughes, supra note 8, at 527.
1 RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 82 (2010).
I See id. at 81-82.
" See id. at 82-83.
20 Id. at 83; Biography, RICHARD A. CLARKE, http://www.richardaclarke.net/bio.php (last visited
Feb. 4, 2015).
2014-2015] 459
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Secondly, ARPANET intertwined military and civilian communication
networks. 21 Initially this posed no security problem. However, with time this
feature gave rise to two significant challenges, one legal and the other strategic.22
First, under this intertwined network, it is difficult to determine when a target is
legally military or civilian, which is a necessary determination for proper application
of the law of armed conflict.23 Second, and more worrisome, this feature made
military assets vulnerable to cyber attack through a largely uncontrolled network.24
Despite ARPANET's ostensibly utopian beginning, it did not take long before
nefarious activity started disrupting the network.2 s The first instances of malware
were not destructive in the modern sense but rather designed to annoy and prank
other users.26 The Creeper Virus was an example of annoying malware. Emerging
in 1971, the Creeper was the first self-replicated virus, but fortunately it did
nothing more than post a message on the infected user's computer screen reading,
"I'm the Creeper: Catch me if you can!" 2 7 The first antivirus program, the Reaper,
eradicated the Creeper.28
Once the new millennium was underway, ARPANET had long since become
obsolete and the Internet had grown into a global computing network. In the
1990s, the world, particularly the United States, adopted information-technology
("IT") throughout society. Zealous IT companies of this new era developed an
endless array of cost-saving technologies and persuaded both government and
private industry to integrate the new systems as rapidly as possible. 29
IT penetrated nearly every facet of life, corporate profits exploded, and the
economy boomed.30 The IT revolution fundamentally transitioned industrial and
governmental operations away from manual control to digital control systems.3
These developments were so ubiquitous and met with such enthusiasm that manual
systems were not only retired, they were also eliminated as emergency
replacements.3 Richard Clarke and Robert Knake likened this situation to Cort6s
destroying his ships after reaching the New World.3 That our society entered the
new millennium relying almost exclusively on computer-based systems is the crux
for why cyberspace, and, by extension, cyber war is a matter of the highest
importance.
21 See Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, J.L. & CYBER WARFARE, Winter
2012, at 8, 15.
22 See id.
23 SeeJEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 47-48 (2d ed. 2012).
24 See id.
25 See Thomas M. Chen & Jean-Marc Robert, The Evolution of Viruses and Worms, in
STATISTICAL METHODS IN COMPUTER SECURITY 265,268-270 (William W. S. Chen ed., 2005).
26 See id.
27 See Gervais, supra note 21, at 17.
28 d.
2 See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 17, at 96.
3o See id. at 96-97.
31 Id. at 96.
32 Id. at 97.
33 Id.
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One of the earliest demonstrations of computer-based system vulnerability
came when the "Slammer worm" hit the Internet in January 2003.34 Slammer
exploited a weakness in Microsoft server code.3s Doubling every 8.5 seconds, the
worm did 90% of its damage within the first ten minutes. 6 The effects of Slammer
were staggering: ATMs in the United States malfunctioned, 911 systems and
airline reservations were scrambled, portions of the Internet in South Korea and
Japan shut down, phone service in Finland was disrupted," and it even disabled the
safety monitoring system at an Ohio nuclear plant for five hours."The crippling
effects of Slammer served as a wake-up call, but it also gave a glimpse into the
astounding power of cyber weaponry.
By the end of the new millennium's first decade, the full range of dangers
lurking in cyberspace was apparent. Military and corporate espionage had reached
epidemic levels, " and the hacking of financial institution websites was
commonplace.40 Personal security was equally lacking as phishing emails routinely
duped unsuspecting computer users into voluntarily giving out critical personal
information, such as social security numbers. 41
While troublesome, these cyber attacks were minor compared to the tactics
allegedly used in the first instances of cyber war. There is not an official definition
of a cyber weapon, but it has been aptly defined as "malicious software that
possesses an offensive capability."42
Russia allegedly deployed cyber weaponry freely in the late 2000's, first against
Estonia in 2007 and then against Georgia in 2008.43 This Note does not seek to
substantiate or dispute the veracity of allegations made against Russia. Rather, this
Note solely uses these circumstances to demonstrate the idiosyncrasies of cyber
weapons in a kinetic war.' The mere fact that these allegations remain unproven
underscores a vexing problem unique to cyber war. In cyber war, unlike traditional
3 See Cyberwar: The Warnings?, PBS FRONTLINE (Apr. 24, 2003),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/.
35 id.
36 Id.
3 See id.
3' Kevin Poulsen, Slammer Worm Crashed Ohio Nuke Plant Network, SECURITYFOCUS (Aug.
19, 2003), http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767.
3 See Kevin G. Coleman, The Growing Risk of Cyber Attack and Other Security Threats, IRMI:
THE RISK REP. (Nov. 2008), http://www.hwphillips.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/The-Growing-
Risk-of-Cyber-Attack-and-Other-Security-Threats.pdf.
' See Michael R. Crittenden, A Call to Arms for Banks, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2013, 7:51 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324049504578545701557015878.
41 See Thomas D. Farrell, Don't Get Speared in the Cyber War, HAW. Bj., Nov. 2011, at 27, 27.
42 Louise Arimatsu, A Treaty for Governing Cyber-Weapons: Potential Benefits and Practical
Limitations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT
91, 97 (Christian Czosseck et al. eds., 2012), available athttps://ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedin
s/2_3_ArimatsuATreatyForGoverningCyber-Weapons.pdf.
4' See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 17, at 14-21.
" Kinetic war is a euphemism for a war involving lethal force. It is a useful term to distinguish
between wars involving lethal force and those involving cyber force. See generally Jonathan Allen,
'Kinetic Military Action' or 'War?, POLITICO (Mar. 24, 2011, 2:39 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51893.html
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war, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the source of a cyber weapon; this
is known as attribution and is readily elusive during cyber war.
The Estonian attack was the result of a political disagreement between Russia
and Estonia concerning Estonia's relocation of a former Soviet Union grave
marker.4 5 The weapon of choice was a distributed denial of service ("DDoS"),
which essentially floods a network with data to create a sort of cyber paralysis. 46 For
over a week the DDoS attack took down websites of banks, Parliament, the
president, and various communication entities. 4 The Kremlin denied any
involvement in the incident and even went so far as to say that it was simply a case
of Russian nationalists expressing their frustration over the Estonian grave marker
relocation. 48 Russia's denial demonstrated one of the overarching concerns of cyber
warfare, which is the lack of attribution (identifying the culpable party). 49
A year later, Russia instigated a territorial dispute with its neighbor Georgia.5 0
As a prelude to a full land, sea, and air invasion, Russia (allegedly) launched a
sophisticated cyber attack against Georgia's government and media websites.5 ' Like
the Estonian attacks, Georgia's networks were crippled by a wave of DDoS
attacks. 52 This use of cyber attacks was noteworthy because Russia dramatically
improved the efficacy of its kinetic war effort by diminishing Georgia's command
and control communications.5 3 Russia again denied any involvement in the attacks,
and aside from evidence tracing the initial attacks to Russian servers, the former
Soviet Union was never conclusively implicated.5 4
Similar attacks were directed at the Ukrainian government and NATO in
March 2014, contemporaneous with Russia's Crimean incursion.ss Again, Russia
denied direct involvement with the attacks.5 6
The events in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine may have shocked the cyber
security community, but they likely left no one surprised. However, what alarmed
cyber security officials and virtually anyone affiliated with IT and/or the military
4s Id. at 13.
* Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution: International Law and the Emergence of Cyber
Warfare, 31 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 602, 611 (2011).
4 See id. at 616 n.61.
4 Id. at 617 n.62.
41 See CARR, supra note 23, at 47.
s See Raboin, supra note 46, at 619.
s' Id. at 619-20.
52 John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/1 3 cyber.html?_r=O.
s" John Arquilla, Cyberwar is Already upon Us, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/artides/2012/02/27/cyberwar-is-already-upon-us.
54 Id.
s Adrian Croft & Peter Apps, NATO Websites Hit in Cyber Attack Linked to Crimea Tension,
REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2014, 10:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/us-ukraine-nato-
idUSBREA2EOT320140316; Ukraine Hit by Cyberattacks: Head of Ukraine Security Service,
REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2014, 6:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-ukraine-crisis-
telecoms-idUSBREA230Q920140304.
s" Croft & Apps, supra note 55. This Note is not a forum to implicate Russia, but the circumstances
discussed herein strongly suggest that kinetic war and cyber war are both common and compatible.
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was the emergence of "Stuxnet" in 2010.s" The strangely named computer worm
was a cyber weapon piece de r6sistance and a startling leap toward a future where
cyber attacks reach beyond the digital realm to destroy objects in the physical
world.5 1
In approximately 2006, unconfirmed reports indicate that the United States, in
collaboration with Israel, commenced development of a cyber weapon that could
target Iran's nuclear program.s9 Four years later, in the summer of 2010, reports
circulated worldwide that a "worm" was infecting computer systems of all levels-
the worm was named Stuxnet.6 0 Stuxnet infected inestimable systems worldwide
but left them unscathed.6 ' However, when Stuxnet finally reached its destination,
the motor-drive system of the Iranian nuclear centrifuges, it caused the centrifuges
to uncontrollably spin at destructively high speeds. 62 In the end, nearly 1,000
centrifuges were demolished and the Iranian nuclear program was stalled for several
years.6 3
Neither the United States nor Israel to date has officially acknowledged any
involvement in Stuxnet,64 though numerous leaks suggest both nations played a role
in its creation.6 s Furthermore, as was the case with Russia, no concrete evidence has
linked either party to the incident (the attribution problem), and Stuxnet is still
"alive" in cyberspace. 6 Stuxnet, although highly sophisticated in its programming,
is smaller than half a megabyte (or approximately one-fourth the size of a photo
taken with an iPhone). 67 The long-term significance of Stuxnet is not immediately
obvious, but in terms of cyber warfare, it was a watershed event-some cyber
security experts have even likened it to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.6 ' As the
s7 See Raboin, supra note 46, at 622.
s See id. n.78.
s' David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June
1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-
against-iran.html.
6 See id.
6 The Stuxnet Outbreak. A Worm in the Centrifuge, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2010,
www.economist.com/node/17147818.
' See id.; see also Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Stuxnet Was Work of US. and Israeli
Experts, Officials Say, WASH. POST, June 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U story.html.
* Nakashima &Warrick, supra note 62.
"See id.
6s See id.
" Kelly Jackson Higgins, Stuxnet Exploits Still Alive & Well, DARK READING (Aug. 14, 2014,
4:45 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/stuxnet-exploits-still-alive-and-well-/d/d-
id/1298051; see genealy KASPERSKY LAB, KASPERSKY SECURITY NETWORK REPORT: WINDOWS
USAGE &VULNERABILITIES (2014), available at http://securelist.com/files/2014/08/KasperskyLab
KSNreportvwindows-usageeng.pdf (analyzing the behavior of windows users and their exposure to
potential risks for failing to update the system).
" David Kushner, The Real Story of Stuxnet, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 26, 2013, 2:00 PM),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet; Anand Lal Shimpi, The iPhone 5s
Review, ANANDTECH (Sept. 17, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.anandtech.com/show/7335/the-iphone-
5s-review/10.
" David E. Sanger, Mutualy Assured Cyberdestruction?, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/sunday-review/mutually-assured-cyberdestruction.html; Molly
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bombing of Hiroshima ushered in the age of looming nuclear war, so, too, has
Stuxnet brought the era of cyber war.
In summation, the preceding 40 years have been technologically stunning, but
the advancements have not been risk-free. The confluence of the following four
elements makes the perils of cyberspace worthy of serious public debate: the
nascent architecture of the Internet allowed for its explosive growth and remarkable
power but also made it a potent medium for wrongdoing and war making; the
intertwining of civilian and military infrastructure creates challenging legal issues
and expanded military targets; a lack of attribution diminishes the risk of
retribution thereby encouraging cyber attacks; and the precedent of using cyber
weapons offensively in pursuit of military objectives has been established.
II. THIS IS NOT YOUR GRANDDAD'S KIND OF WAR: WHY CYBERSPACE IS
DIFFERENT FROM TRADITIONAL BATTLEFIELDS
War has been a tragic feature of our species since time immemorial. Our history
is littered with stories of mass casualties and development of terrifyingly powerful
weapons. Through all of the atrocities, however, the means of using blood and steel
have remained mostly constant until now. Traditional battlefields rely on
information as an instrument to deploy kinetic weapons, such as missiles, troops,
and submarines. In cyber war, information is the weapon." Adjustment to this
evolution has been tentative at best, most notably within international law and
specifically the United Nations Charter.
Suppose the United States military seeks to destroy a chemical weapons facility
within the sovereign territory of an enemy state. The President can take the
traditional approach by ordering the launch of a guided missile to demolish the
target. This option will be costly; it will generate endless news reporting and
footage, and will likely produce political criticism domestically and
internationally-with specific claims that the action violates Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter.o Alternatively, the President could order a Stuxnet-like
attack against the facility to destroy it. The latter approach would come at a modest
cost, would be anonymous, or at the very least, plausibly deniable; and, under
current international law, this approach would not be a violation of state
sovereigntyn or the use of force clause in the U.N. Charter.7 2 The only major
drawback to using a cyber weapon is that sometimes a missile may be a quicker
Bernhart Walker, Mulvenon: Stuxnet Was Hiroshima, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT (July 30, 2012),
http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/mulvenon-stuxnet-was-hiroshima/2012-07-30.
6 See Hughes, supra note 8, at 526-27.
0 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
n See generally Arimatsu, supra note 42, at 100-02.
72 See Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article
2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 426, 448 (2011).
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solution if the cyber weapon must first be developed. Nonetheless, the incentives
currently in place tend to make cyber war preferable to kinetic war."
Cyber warfare also alters the landscape of geopolitical relations. For example, it
remains an open question as to whether a country, like Iran, can respond defensibly
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to the Stuxnet attack.74 First, Iran would have
to identify the culpable party or parties, which to date remain unconfirmed.
Furthermore, assuming a response is legal and Iran confirms the origin of Stuxnet,
would the response have to be a proportional cyber attack, or could it be a kinetic
attack? The international community has not established rules to answer these
questions and govern this scenario.75
In addition to an insufficient international legal regime for cyber war, there is
no generally accepted doctrine to keep the peace, such as the Cold War Mutually
Assured Destruction ("MAD") doctrine. 76 Under MAD, the Soviet Union
refrained from launching nuclear weapons at the United States simply because the
United States would retaliate with its nuclear weapons leaving both nations
completely destroyed.7 MAD does not apply to cyber warfare for the following
reasons: it is exercised instantaneously and without warning, thereby eliminating
any opportunity to reciprocate; it lacks attribution; and, it can be conducted by a
non-state actor operating beyond the political considerations of most national
leaders.78
Concern over cyber war is not without its critics." Critics correctly state that
thus far no humans have been killed by a cyber attack, and no evidence exists to
contradict this assertion." There is also a belief that cyber warfare is preferable to
kinetic war, but this attitude is predicated on the belief that cyber warfare can be
restricted to cyberspace or will only damage limited, specific targets in the physical
world."' These observations are not meritless, but they are backward looking and
represent a minority position. In contrast, a recent survey of 352 defense officials
7 See CARR, supra note 23 (noting that passive defenses and criminal laws are insufficient to deal
with cyber-attacks).
' See Sanger, supra note 68; see also U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
" James Farwell & Rafal Rohozinski, The New Reality of Cyber War, DEFENCE IQ(Oct. 22,
2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.defenceiq.com/cyber-defence/articles/the-new-reality-of-cyber-wa.
76 See Sanger, supra note 68.
n See id.
n See CARR, supra note 23.
7 Cyber-War&re: Hype and Fear, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21567886-america-leading-way-developing-doctrines-
cyber-warfare-other-countries-may/print; Thomas Rid, Think Again: Cyberwar, FOREIGN POLICY
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/27/think-again-cyberwar.
so Cyber-Warfare: Hype and Fear, supra note 79.
s Id.
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named a cyber attack as the single greatest threat against the United States
(terrorism was a distant second)." Similar perspectives are found within the United
States Congress. House Intelligence Committee Chairman, Representative Mike
Rogers, recently said of a cyber attack that it is the "largest national security threat
to . . . face the U.S. that we are not even close to being prepared to handle as a
country."83
III. WHERE WE ARE: CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC LAW REGARDING CYBERSPACE
On the international level, discussions over how to govern cyberspace and cyber
warfare are not new, but they have also not been very constructive.84 Sovereignty
has been an essential concept in international law since the Treaty of Westphalia,8 5
and few concepts complicate cyber warfare discussions more than this one. Because
cyberspace transcends national borders on the one hand and has substantial effects
within national boundaries on the other hand, it turns the Treaty of Westphalia
upside-down.8 6
For example, if the United States directs a cyber attack against the
Cameroonian power grid, and the grid relies on a French Internet Service Provider
("ISP") with critical servers physically located in France, then the attack is not an
attack with effects solely in Cameroon. France could claim a violation of its
territory, or Cameroon could view France as complicit in the United States
intrusion. The default perspective is to view France as a neutral party. " However,
the default position ignores the complexities of cyberspace."8
One of the few international laws to have meaningful effect on cyber warfare is
the International Telecommunication Convention ("ITC")." The ITC requires
member states to monitor domestic telecommunication networks and to prevent
such networks from being used to transmit information damaging to the State.90
" Jordain Carney, Defense Leaders Say Cyber is Top Terror Threat, NAT'L J. (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/defense-leaders-say-cyber-is-top-terror-threat-20140106.
' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
* See Arimatsu, supra note 42, at 94.
8s See generally Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,
21 INTL HIST. REv. 569, 569 (1999).
16 See Hughes, supra note 8, at 535-36.
" See Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law,
64 A.F. L. REv. 121, 153 (2009) (discussing the idea that the unauthorized use of another nation's
networks may not constitute an unlawful use of force). Schaap highlights that the United Nations
Security Council has not viewed intrusions into foreign airspace as unlawful uses of force. Id. These
scenarios are comparable to one belligerent nation using a third-party nation's territory as a launch site
or pass-thru for military tactics against another belligerent nation.
s Arimatsu, supra note 42, at 107 (noting that malware can be routed through servers in different
countries and, therefore, creates complexities distinct from traditional kinetic attacks).
" Schaap, supra note 87, at 164 (citing Article 35 of the ITC as an example of the potential
regulation of cyber warfare by virtue of prohibiting intentional interference with radio spectrum).
9 Id. at 164-65.
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The Obama administration has taken steps to promote international standards
governing cyberspace. In its "International Strategy for Cyberspace" of May 2011,
the White House voiced support for strengthening network security, promoting
freedom of content, and formalizing international standards.91 The publication
provides normative standards for cyberspace strategy and iterates that the United
States, like all sovereign states, reserves the right of self-defense against aggressive
actions taken in cyberspace. 2 To what extent the White House might invoke this
right remains to be seen, but the publication clearly suggests that the Obama
administration views cyber aggression as subject to the right of self-defense found
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.9 3
Despite overtures from the international community and the White House,
nothing yet in international law explicitly prohibits/governs the use of cyber
weapons. 94 This legal void allows the current cyber arms race to continue
unchecked, which serves only to increase the likelihood of cyber warfare in the
future. 9s
Domestically there has been more activity to prepare for cyber war, but this
activity is far from sufficient. In 2010, the Department of Defense launched the
United States Cyber Command to oversee its more than 15,000 networks and
more than seven million computer devices.9' Generally, United States Cyber
Command oversees the United States government's entire ".mil" domain.9 7 As for
the United States' ".gov" domain for the civilian portion of the federal government,
security is under the control of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")."
The primary DHS office in charge of ".gov" security is the Office of Cybersecurity
and Communications ("CS&C"). 99 The CS&C has express authority over the
".gov" domain, but its role concerning ".com" is merely to "collaborate with the
private sector." 00 It is the lack of authority over ".com" that leaves much of the
national network at risk.
91 THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY,
SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 8 (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/internationalstrategy-for-cyberspace.pdf.
92 Id. at 14 (recognizing the inherent right of all sovereign states to self-defense and clarifying that
the United States will respond to cyber threats like it would any other threat).
" Id. at 10 ("Consistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to self-
defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace."); see also U.N. Charter art. 51
(providing the inherent right for a Member of the United Nations to act in self-defense in the event of
an armed attack against that Member).
9 See Schaap, supra note 87, at 124 (noting that international law does not directly address cyber
warfare, although cyber attacks that cause physical damage can violate international laws relating to
armed conflict).
9s See Hughes, supra note 8, at 533 (noting that despite the cyber arms race among sovereign states,
there remains no international consensus on how to apply the law of war to cyber-attacks).
96 See William J. Lynn III, Opinion, Introducing U.S. Cyber Command, WALL ST. J., June 3,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704875604575280881128276448.
9 Id.
9 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF CYBERSECURITY & COMMC'NS,
http://www.dhs.gov/office-cybersecurity-and-communications (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
9 Id.
1oo Id.
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Congress has floundered for years to produce meaningful cyber security
legislation, and even when it has come close, the legislation has been limited to
cyber defense, not offense. 0' The main reasons for Congress' ineffectiveness have
been first, privacy concerns' 02 and, second, burdensome regulation of business.' 03
Certainly these are legitimate reservations, as a legislative overhaul of this
magnitude would undoubtedly affect nearly every individual or private entity in the
nation. However, leaving cyber security policy to the discretion of private industry
is not justified considering how integral private industry is to the national security
of the United States. Further, failure to adequately secure the Internet is already
eroding privacy and burdening economic activity.
As Richard Grelling wrote in his treatise, The Crime, "[W]hen all other means
fail, the highest ends of peace are only to be attained by war . . . ." 104 Likewise, an
inadequate cyber defense structure is likely to encourage future cyber-attacks. As
evidenced by Congress' past efforts to pass cyber security legislation, future
attempts will likely be limited to the defense of the national network. Given
Congress' inability to pass defense legislation, it is not likely to attempt to pass
legislation addressing the power to make cyber offensives.
IV. BRINGING THE WPR INTO THE 21" CENTURY: AMENDING THE
WPR TO PREPARE FOR THE WARS OF THE FUTURE
The United States Constitution is the dominant legal text defining the
President's authority over foreign affairs and issues arising under his
Commander-in-Chief role.' 05 This Note does not question whether provisions
enumerated in the United States Constitution are adequate to address the concerns
of cyber warfare; rather this author believes they provide sufficient latitude to the
President. Second to the Unites States Constitution, the War Powers Resolution of
1973 ("WPR") places restraints upon executive authority. The constitutional basis
for the WPR is Congress' power to declare war.0 6 In the following paragraphs, this
Note will discuss the origin and purpose of the WPR, why the WPR should be
applied and amended, and how it should be amended.
"o See generally Brian Fung, Why Waiting for Congress to Fix Cybersecurity Is a Waste of Time,
WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/01/why-
waiting-for-congress-to-fix-cybersecurity-is-a-waste-of-time (profiling two U.S. Senate bills,
Lieberman, Collins Cybersecurity Act of 2012 and Cybersecurity and American Cyber Competitiveness
Act of 2013, and one U.S. House bill, Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), as cyber
defense measures that have failed to pass both chambers of Congress).
1" Alina Selyukh, House Passes Cybersecurity Bill as Privacy Concerns Linger, REUTERS (Apr. 18,
2013, 9:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/19/net-us-usa-cybersecurity-congress-
idUSBRE93HOYU20130419 (reporting that President Obama threatened to veto the Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) due to privacy concerns).
'See Fung, supra note 101.
1- 2 RICHARD GRELLING, THE CRIME 208 (Alexander Gray trans., George H. Doran Co. 1918).
'os U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-2 (obligating the President to serve as Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces, make Treaties, and appoint Ambassadors).
"" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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Congress passed the WPR in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate.
Both events spurred Congress to adopt policies meant to weaken the President's
power 07 so Congress strengthened its own war-declaration power by requiring the
President keep Congress informed of any war-like activities. ' The major
characteristics of the WPR are that it (1) requires the President to notify Congress
of the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities no later than
48-hours after such introduction ("reporting provision") and (2) that the United
States Armed Forces cannot remain engaged in hostilities longer than sixty days
without an authorization for military force or a declaration of war from Congress
("authorization/declaration provision"). 109
Unsurprisingly, presidents have not embraced the WPR since its passage, but
this Note does not analyze the history of presidential dismissiveness toward the
WPR."1 o For this Note's purposes, the WPR is taken at face value as the law of the
land. However, even if the WPR is considered the reigning law regarding war
making in the United States, the WPR as currently written is too antiquated for
the unique war making conditions created by cyber warfare.
A. Why Apply and Amend the WPR?
Before assessing the WPR's inadequacies, a frequent and legitimate concern
must be confronted. This issue is whether the WPR must be amended at all in
light of Congress' authority to simply grant limited powers to the President to
conduct cyber war. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States
confronted a new threat, and it was believed that the President needed broad
authority to combat the menace. "' Accordingly, Congress passed the
Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF") and the Global War on Terror
commenced. 112 With the Global War on Terror the United States encountered a
new threat, and yet the WPR did not require amendment. So why would an
amendment be required to face cyber war? The short answer is that the AUMF and
the WPR both envision traditional warfare (soldiers, tanks, jets, and ships).
However, cyber war does not, and most likely will not, resemble traditional warfare.
This distinction makes the current WPR incongruent with the risks posed by cyber
weapons.
1'0 David Gray Adler & Michael A. Genovese, Vietnam, Watergate, and the War Power:
Presidential Aggrandizement and Congressional Abdication, in WATERGATE REMEMBERED: THE
LEGACY FOR AMERICAN POLITICS 87, 95 (Michael A. Genovese & Iwan W. Morgan eds., 2012).
1s Id.
10 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543-44 (2012).
"' Brian Hughes, Interactive: Presidents Historicallr Have Ignored War Powers Resolution,
WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 6, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/interactive-presidents-
historically-have-ignored-war-powers-resolution/article/2535123.
111 Alan Rozenshtein, Authorization for Use of Militay Force 2001, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2012,
6:27 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/post-911-era-material
s/post-911-era-materials-legislative-materials/authorization-for-use-of-military-force.
112 Id.
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The central proposition of the 'WPR is congressional oversight for the use of
the United States Armed Forces in hostilities.' 1 3 It is tempting, and strongly
arguable, to suggest that the WPR is wholly inapplicable to cyber war because
cyber war does not involve the armed forces in the traditional sense. This
observation is technically correct, and, accordingly, an AUMF-like authority for
cyber war would not seamlessly fall under current WPR language. However, three
reasons suggest this is not a basis for dismissing the applicability of the WPR.
First, most conceivable uses of cyber weaponry will involve military personnel at
some level, even if they are only sitting behind a keyboard. These individuals will
not be in harms-way as in times past, but they will still be executing orders of the
Commander-in-Chief against a war target.'14 For this reason, Congress will assert,
with some credibility, that the WPR is applicable even in its present form. In fact,
Congress has ostensibly stated that it believes the WPR applies to cyber war
activities, though specific legislation to this point remains elusive.' 15 The mere fact
that Congress does, or at least would, assert the relevance of the WPR is sufficient
basis not to dismiss its applicability.
Second, there is a public policy issue favoring an amended WPR that goes
beyond whether Congress would or would not assert its applicability. If the United
States suffered a large-scale cyber attack, then Congress would likely provide an
AUMF-like authority to prosecute a cyber war. If such an authority were granted
without amending the WPR to encompass the facets of cyber war, then presidents
would have an incentive to utilize cyber war as a means of evading WPR reporting
provisions. This would diminish transparency and deny the public an opportunity
to its government accountable.
Presidents of both political parties have historically resented the WPR as an
encroachment upon their power."' In fact, the Pentagon has posited that the WPR
is not relevant to cyber conflict."1 7 The delicate balance of war-making power
between the President and Congress ought to be based on a thorough evaluation of
the conflict and the policies necessary to quell the conflict. If, however, the
President is given one set of WVPR-covered war-making authorities (i.e.,
traditional, kinetic war powers) and another set of non-WPR-covered war-making
authorities (i.e., cyber war powers), then the President will tilt toward using cyber
war powers more often because they afford greater unilateral decision-making. This
scenario creates a perverse incentive that encourages cyber war arbitrarily not
necessarily because it is the optimal instrument of offensive war making.
Third, because cyberspace intertwines civilian and military networks and many
civilian assets are strategic targets (e.g., the power grid) or instruments of cyber war
u1 §§ 1542-1544.
114 Donna Miles, Cyber Command Builds 'Cyber Warrior' Capabilities, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. (Sept.
27, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArtide.aspx?ID=65459.
us H.R. REP. NO. 112-329, at 255-56 (2012) (Conf Rep.).
"1 See Hughes, supra note 110.
"1 See Jason Healey & Aj. Wilson, Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution: Congressional
Oversight of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 2-3 (2013),
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication.pdfs/403/bscl30221cyberwprpub.pdf.
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(e.g., civilian ISPs), the President's cyber war-making needs will envelope the
private sector in some form. In accordance with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, the President must have express authority from Congress to expand his
Commander-in-Chief authority into the private sector."' Therefore, Congress
should grant express authority to the President using the WPR as the legislative
vehicle. If done prospectively, it should improve oversight and regulation of any
presidential intrusion into the private sector.
Given the features of cyber war thus far articulated, it is reasonable and
necessary for the national security of the United States that Congress grant the
President standing authority to intervene in the private sector when executing a
cyber offensive or defensive strategy as part of his Commander-in-Chief and
foreign affair powers. An example of how this authority may be needed is found in
the 2009 Iranian election protests. Iranian election protestors used Twitter (a
civilian social network) to coordinate DDoS attacks against the Iranian
government." 9 Should Twitter be used in a future DDoS attack against the United
States military, the President may be compelled to temporarily shut Twitter down.
Presently, the WPR fails to foresee a scenario where the President might need to
carryout a cyber war strategy via civilian IT. Should this situation arise it would be
prudent to have guidelines in place.
By granting the President authority to intervene in the private sector, it is likely
that private entities will perform roles akin to military roles. As this would occur
outside of the United States Armed Forces and would be analogous to mercenary
action, the WPR should be amended to include this scenario under Congressional
oversight. Failing to amend the NWPR in this regard could encourage the President
to circumvent the WPR by relying more readily on civilian assets to prosecute a
cyber war. Though both civilian and military assets would likely be required, as a
matter of public policy it is preferable to have the President rely mostly on the
military, and only the private sector in a legal and transparent manner.
Having such legal authority in place would allow the President to maneuver
quickly during an attack. However, this grant should not be without routine
congressional oversight, which is why an amended WPR is the most effective legal
instrument to adapt to the future of cyber war.
In short, as cyber warfare becomes a more utilized conflict medium, the WPR
risks fading into irrelevance as currently written. However, the WPR should not be
dispensed with because it does provide useful conceptual architecture for how
Congress and the President can share war-making powers. Some scholars have
suggested that the current WPR can be loosely interpreted to cover cyber warfare;
however, this Note contends that such arguments are a weak substitute for a
deliberate amendment process-the issues at stake warrant the thoroughness
provided by contemporary legislation.12 0 Therefore, an amendment designed to
make the WPR applicable to twenty-first century war can keep the WPR both
..s See Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-87 (1952).
"9 See CARR, supra note 23, at 144.
120 See Healey &Wilson, supra note 117, at 1, 4-5.
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relevant and useful, and can avoid the sort of political charades that often
accompany interpretations of antiquated laws.
B. How to Amend the WPR
If the WPR is to be amended, it must be changed in ways that reflect the
unique qualities of cyber war. The existing WPR provisions should remain in effect
for traditional, kinetic war, but new sections pertaining to cyber conflict must be
added. By keeping the oversight authority of the WPR, Congress may maintain its
precedent of receiving scheduled reports from the President regarding any
hostilities-cyber or kinetic.'2 1 However, an amended WPR can also serve as a tool
to expand presidential power in a way that fits the complexities of cyber war.
Currently, Presidents are allowed by law to conduct covert operations (i.e.,
intelligence gathering) and commence war.1 22 The reasons the President has these
powers are both constitutional and statutory: first, the Constitution grants the
President authority over foreign affairs;123 and, second, Congress appreciates the
national security necessities of allowing the President some flexibility to make
snap-decisions. 124 Cyber warfare can fit within either covert or war-making
activities, but not without ambiguity. The following hypothetical illustrates this
dilemma: The United States decides that elimination of a biological weapons plant
in North Korea is in its national security interest. The United States will likely first
gather intelligence about the facility, which can be procured covertly by a variety of
means, such as human operatives, drones, and computer viruses. If the United
States sends human operatives to assess the facility, it falls under covert-actions
laws that simply require the President to inform congressional intelligence
committees. 125 If, on the other hand, the United States infects the facility
computers with a virus designed to relay information, it is unclear whether this is
covert activity. Advancing the hypothetical further to a point where the human
operative destroys the facility makes the scenario more like a war action, which
could trigger the WPR. However, if the same virus is used to destroy the facility,
like Stuxnet did, would it be an act of war, a covert operation, or something
different?
The distinction between the operative and the virus may not be apparent at
first, but consider a third scenario where the operative that assesses the facility also
installs a remote-detonated explosive and then leaves the site. The explosive can
now remain undetonated until some future date-perhaps years later. For practical
purposes, this is how cyber weapons can operate. To pose a latent yet instantaneous
121 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543-1544 (2012).
122 Stephen Dycus, Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 155,
156-58 (2010).
123 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
124 See generaly WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF
DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION, at xiv-xv (2003) (discussing the president's ability to take unilateral
action without the consent of Congress).
'" See Dycus, supra note 122, at 158-60.
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risk makes the covert versus war making distinctions irrelevant and as a
consequence makes applicability of the current WPR very unclear.
Accordingly, the WPR should be amended to define cyber war hostilities as
those that are likely to have a kinetic effect (i.e. destruction or disruption of a
physical structure or device) in the imminent future. When war, either cyber or
kinetic, is foreseeable Presidential authority should be at its apex. Allowing
Congress the option to obstruct latent tactics on the basis that they are hostilities
under the WPR would render Presidential authority on cyber offense mostly
toothless in the eyes of an enemy. This standard would allow the President to
install offensive cyber weapons without Congressional intrusion into
Commander-in-Chief decisions but would not allow the President to activate said
weapons without triggering application of the WPR reporting provision.
Analogous to a kinetic war scenario, this standard would allow the President to
have an explosive installed without concern for the WPR, but once the decision is
made to detonate the device, the WPR would become applicable. An amended
WPR would, through the legislative process, introduce important political
considerations in the president's use of latent cyber weapons.
The purpose of focusing on the decision to activate and not the actual activation
is the instantaneous effect of cyber weapons. It would be largely symbolic (i.e.,
meaningless) to require the President to report to Congress concerning a cyber
attack that has already occurred.
Additionally, the authorization/declaration provision of the VVPR should be
amended to expressly exclude automated cyber weapons.'26 While the statutory
grant of expanded war power would be the most substantive amendment to the
WPR, other alterations would be warranted as well. Even when war is not
foreseeable, there is still a risk that cyber weapons may be deployed against the
United States (e.g., a cyber Pearl Harbor). The instantaneous impact of such
attacks may require the United States to pre-emptively imbed automated cyber
weapons 127 within non-United States networks regardless of whether war is
foreseeable. This may seem like science fiction, but a recent leak by Edward
Snowden alleges existence of a National Security Agency program-codenamed
"MonsterMind"-that serves this exact purpose.1 28 Such a program would improve
the ability to reciprocate with a self-defense attack (i.e., if China. begins disabling
the United States electric grid, then a preemptively placed cyber weapon would
initiate an automated strike against the Chinese electric grid). This is different
126 See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(a) (2012) (requiring, implicitly, the same action for cyber warfare as for
traditional forms of warfare).
127 Jeffrey L. Caton, Complexity and Emergence in Ultra-Tactical Cyberspace Operations, in
Exploring the Prudent Limits of Automated Cyber Attack, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 299, 299-300 (K. Podins, J. Stinissen & M.
Maybaum eds., 2013), available at http://www.cedcoe.org/publications/2013proceedings/CyCon-2013
Proceedings.pdf.
128 See James Bamford, Edward Snowden: The Untold Story, WIRED, Aug. 22, 2014,
http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden (noting that Edward Snowden is the former National
Security Agency employee infamous for leaking classified information regarding National Security
Agency data surveillance programs).
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from the latent cyber weapon discussed in the preceding two paragraphs because
the attack would not commence following a decision by the President but, rather,
would begin automatically if the United States were attacked. These activities
should be reported to congressional intelligence committees and be subject to
statutory guidelines, but it would be self-defeating to mandate under the WPR that
they be reported to Congress for approval. A latent, automated cyber weapon,
though potentially necessary, would be impossible to implement if doing so
requires a formal authorization/declaration from Congress. Congress can maintain
input over cyber weaponry, even those that are automated, but requiring a
pre-emptive authorization/declaration for an automated weapon is unsound and
illogical.
Furthermore, this Note strongly advises Congress to shorten the traditional
forty-eight hour reporting provision and sixty-day authorization/declaration
provision when cyber war is at issue. Through cyber war, the President can cripple
an entire country within seconds, which makes a forty-eight hour reporting period
moot. Presently, the WPR implicitly assumes a war cannot begin and end within
two days, but such a scenario is not improbable when cyber weapons are involved.
It would be more consistent with cyber war to require the President to report to
Congress within an hour. Likewise, a sixty-day authorization/declaration provision
is sensible in a world where the mobilization of troops requires weeks of public,
non-clandestine activities. The two-month period allows the public, with Congress
as its proxy, to evaluate the merit of the war policy. However, a sixty-day window is
ineffective when a cyber-war can begin within seconds following a single
keystroke. 129 In matters of cyber war, Congress should consider an
authorization/declaration timeframe of no more than twenty-four hours.
Traditional wars have, with few exceptions, been measured in years. Cyber war, on
the other hand, could conceivably be measured in hours-or even minutes.
As if the aforementioned considerations do not complicate this issue enough,
government must not undermine the Internet's worth by supplanting it as little
more than a military and surveillance tool. The Internet has transcended the digital
world and become integral to democracy, and, as some have argued, is even a basic
human right. 30 The proper role of Congress and the President, therefore, is to
protect the Internet and its users, not to limit its value with overbroad controls and
intrusions. Even though the threat of cyber war is palpable, the Internet must
remain an open network that is at its core a medium for the free flow of
information. For this reason, this Note implores a thorough and public debate of
the recommendations contained herein. Though military activities will ultimately
necessitate secrecy at some level, establishing rules to govern cyber war should
begin with an open discussion that educates the public and receives input from the
citizenry.
129 See Dycus, supra note 122, at 157-58.
13 Nicola Lucchi, Access to Network Services and Protection of Constitutional Rights:
Recognizing the Essential Role of Internet Access for the Freedom of Expression, 19 CARDOZO J.
INT'L &COMP. L. 645, 650, 658-59, 675-76 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
The Internet has revolutionized the lives of nearly each person on the planet in
unimaginably positive ways. However, the Internet has also created hazards that
have the potential to disrupt people's lives in horrific ways. Presently, these
vulnerabilities are growing in number and severity, and there are few efforts
underway to sufficiently address them. This makes the technologically dependent
world extremely helpless in the face of cyber aggression. The most effective way to
respond to this risk is a robust defense structure and a credible offense capability.
The Presidency is best suited, both legally and practically, to develop and
deploy a cyber war offensive strategy. Cyber weaponry is becoming a common
element of traditional war, and it is likely that someday wars may be conducted
mostly, if not exclusively, in cyberspace. Failure to prepare for these coming
conflicts makes them more likely because they will be easier to execute. Presently,
the United States has not formed a legal regime tailored to this threat, but it does
have an existing legal architecture in the WPR to guide its development.
For the WPR to stay relevant and useful it must be amended to fit the times;
otherwise it will become an artifact of a bygone era. The changes recommended in
this Note would expand presidential power to effectively confront cyber war
threats, but would also fortify Congress's (and by extension the public's) oversight
controls. This balance-of-power objective can be advanced by thoughtfully
amending the War Powers Resolution of 1973 to accommodate the perilous new
world we are entering.
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